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This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and
a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tari⁄s and may charge di⁄erent prices for
on-net and o⁄-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent
to foreclose the market in a pro￿table way. If the incumbent bene￿ts from customer
inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if
access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead
the entrant bene￿ts from customer activism, then foreclosure is pro￿table only when
switching costs are large enough.1 Introduction
Telecommunication networks need access to rivals￿customers in order to provide uni-
versal connectivity. This need for interconnection requires cooperation among network
operators, who must agree on access conditions and, in particular, on termination charges
(also called access charges). These wholesale arrangements a⁄ect the operators￿cost of
o⁄-net calls and thus have an impact on retail competition among the operators. This
raises two concerns. The ￿rst is that cooperation over interconnection may be used to
soften downstream competition; the second is that established network operators may
use access charges to foreclose the market.
The former issue was ￿rst addressed by Armstrong (1998) and La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole
(1998a), who show that high access charges indeed undermine retail competition when
networks compete in linear prices and do not price discriminate on the basis of where
the call terminates.1 La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show however that access charges
lose their collusive power when networks compete in other dimensions, as is the case of
two-part tari⁄s, due to a waterbed e⁄ect.2 An increase in the access charge in￿ ates usage
prices, but this makes it more attractive to build market share, which results in ￿ercer
competition for subscribers and lower ￿xed fees: networks can actually ￿nd it worth-
while to spend the full revenue from interconnection fees to build market share, so that
termination charges no longer a⁄ect equilibrium pro￿ts. This pro￿t neutrality has since
been further studied and shown to depend on three assumptions: full-participation, no
termination-based price discrimination and network symmetry.3 L￿pez (2007) moreover
extends the previous static analyses and shows that, in a dynamic setting, even symmet-
ric networks with full consumer participation can use (future) reciprocal access charges
to soften current competition.4
In the case of termination-based price discrimination, Gans and King (2001), building
1High termination charges raise on average the marginal cost of calls, which encourages operators to
maintain high prices.
2The term "waterbed e⁄ect" was ￿rst coined by Prof. Paul Geroski during the investigation of the
impact of ￿xed-to-mobile termination charges on retail prices. See also Genakos and Valletti (2007).
3See Armstrong (2002) and Vogelsang (2003) for a survey of this literature.
4Since departing from cost-based termination charges adversely a⁄ects larger networks, this in turn
reduces networks￿incentives to build market shares.
1on La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), show that a (reciprocal) access charge below cost
reduces competition. The intuition is that o⁄-net calls being then cheaper than on-net
calls, customers favour smaller networks; as a result, networks bid less aggressively for
market share, which raises the equilibrium pro￿ts. However, in practice regulators are
usually concerned that access charges are too high rather than too low, particularly for
mobile operators. As stressed by Armstrong and Wright (2008), this may stem from the
fact that ￿wholesale arbitrage￿limits mobile operators￿ability to maintain high ￿xed-to-
mobile (FTM) charges5 alongside low mobile-to-mobile (MTM) charges, since ￿xed-line
networks could ￿transit￿their calls via another mobile operator in order to bene￿t from
a lower MTM charge.6
The second traditional concern is that cooperation might be insu¢ cient. This issue
usually arises in markets where large incumbent operators face competition from smaller
rivals, and may be tempted to degrade connectivity or use access charges to foreclose the
market. Indeed, small mobile operators often complain that a high termination charge
hurts their ability to compete in an e⁄ective way with large networks. Two arguments
are normally used to motivate this concern. The ￿rst is a supply-side argument, whereby
small operators face higher long-run incremental costs than larger operators due to scale
economies.7 European national regulatory agencies (NRAs) have for example relied on
this argument to justify the adoption of asymmetric termination rates.8
The second argument, which is the focus of this paper, is the presence of demand-
side network e⁄ects resulting from termination-based price discrimination. If for example
5Historically, ￿xed and mobile operators were not really competing against each other, and thus a tra-
ditional "one-way access" analysis applied. Termination charges between those two types of networks are
moreover usually asymmetric, di⁄erent termination costs and regulatory constraints leading to relatively
low charges for mobile-to-￿xed calls and substantially higher charges for ￿xed-to-mobile calls.
6If mobile operators must adopt the same termination charge for FTM and MTM calls, this uniform
charge may then be above cost if the waterbed e⁄ect on FTM is limited or if operators set their own
charges unilaterally.
7It is also argued that cost di⁄erences may be exacerbated by staggered entry dates, unequal access
to spectrum and (lack of) integration between ￿xed and mobile services.
8See for example the decision of the Belgian NRA (DØcision du Conseil de l￿ IBPT) of 11 August
2006, the Decision 2007-0810 of October 4 2007 by the French NRA (ARCEP), the decision (Delibera
3/06/CONS) adopted by the Italian NRA (AGCOM) in January 2006 or the three decisions adopted by
the Spanish NRA (CMT) on 28 September 2006 (Decisions AEM 2006/724, AEM 2006/725 and AEM
2006/726). See also the review of mobile call termination by the regulator and competition authority for
the UK communications industries (OFCOM Mobile Call Termination Statement, 27 March 2007).
2the termination charge is above cost, then prices will be lower for on-net calls; as a
result, customers favour larger networks, in which a higher proportion of calls remain
on-net. Some European NRAs have also relied on this demand-side argument to call for
asymmetric termination charges. For example, in its Decision of October 2007, the French
regulator stressed the presence of network e⁄ects due to o⁄-net/on-net tari⁄ di⁄erentials
that impede smaller networks￿ability to compete e⁄ectively.9 Similarly, in its Decision
of September 2006,10 the Spanish regulator argued that network e⁄ects can place smaller
networks at a disadvantage, and that higher access charges can increase the size of such
network e⁄ects. And in the Common Position adopted on February 2008,11 the European
regulators express the concern that, because of network e⁄ects, "an on-net/o⁄-net retail
price di⁄erential, together with signi￿cantly above-cost mobile termination rates, can, in
certain circumstances, tone down competition to the bene￿t of larger networks".12
To explore this issue, we analyze the competition between two asymmetric networks,
an incumbent and a new entrant. Customers are initially attached to the incumbent
network and incur switching costs if moving to the other network. Thus, as in Klemperer
(1987), to build market share the entrant must bid more aggressively for customers than
the incumbent, which therefore enjoys greater market power. In particular, the incumbent
can keep monopolizing the market when switching costs are large enough; as we will see,
when switching costs are not that large, departing from cost-based termination charges
can help the incumbent maintain its monopoly position and pro￿t.
We ￿rst consider the case where networks not only compete in subscription fees and
in usage prices, but can moreover charge di⁄erent prices for on-net and o⁄-net calls. Such
on-net pricing creates price-mediated network e⁄ects and, as a result, the incumbent can
indeed keep the entrant out of the market and still charge monopoly prices by setting
a large enough markup (or subsidy) on the access charge, even if access charges are
9See section 4.2.2 of ARCEP Decision 2007-0810 of October 4 2007.
10Decision AEM 2006/726, p. 13, 14 and 33.
11See "ERG￿ s Common Position on symmetry of ￿xed call termination rates and symmetry of mobile
call termination rates", adopted by the ERG-Plenary on 28th February 2008, p. 96-102. Available at
http://www.erg.eu.int/.
12The Common Position also stresses that these network e⁄ects can be exacerbated via incoming calls:
a high o⁄-net price will reduce the amount of o⁄-net calls, which in turn lowers the value of belonging
to the smaller network since less people will then call the customers of that network.
3reciprocal. If the incumbent bene￿ts from customer inertia,13 then it has actually an
incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access markup, so as to foreclose the
market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power. Customer inertia thus provides
a form of "virtual" switching costs which, combined with high termination charges, is
a good substitute for "real" switching costs: in the presence of customer inertia, the
incumbent can corner the market and earn the monopoly pro￿t even in the absence of
any real switching costs. A large termination subsidy could also yield the same outcome;
however feasibility constraints may limit subsidies, which may moreover trigger various
types of arbitrage. The scope for foreclosure is more limited when the entrant bene￿ts
from customer activism; while the incumbent may still try to prevent entry, too high an
access charge would allow the entrant to overtake the incumbent. The incumbent may
then prefer to set an above- or below-cost access charge, and foreclosure strategies are
pro￿table only when switching costs are su¢ ciently large.
Our analysis also extends the insight of Gans and King (2001) and shows that, as long
as the two networks share the market, a small access subsidy generates higher equilibrium
pro￿ts (for both networks) than any positive access markup. Yet, it does not follow that
both networks will agree to subsidizing access, since a large enough access markup may
instead allow the incumbent to corner the market, and higher levels might moreover
allow the incumbent to earn the full monopoly pro￿t. Our analysis thus supports the
conventional wisdom that well-established networks prefer high access charges, and seems
to call for regulatory authorities to set bounds on access markups (and subsidies).
Finally, we show that termination-based price discrimination is a key factor. Indeed,
absent on-net pricing, foreclosure strategies are never pro￿table ￿and moreover no longer
feasible in a receiver pays regime.
There are only few insights from the academic literature on the impact of mobile oper-
ators￿termination rates on entry or predation. Calzada and Valletti (2008) extend Gans
and King￿ s analysis to a (symmetric) multi-￿rm industry; they stress that incumbents
13Since on-net pricing generates club e⁄ects, consumers face coordination problems and there may
exist multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices. "Customer inertia" refers to the situation
where, in case of multiple responses, consumers adopt the response that is favourable to the incumbent.
4may favour above-cost termination charges when new operators face entry costs: for any
given number of ￿rms, increasing the charge above cost decreases the equilibrium pro￿ts
but, by the same token, limits the number of entrants; overall, this allows incumbent
operators to increase their own pro￿ts. Hoernig (2007) analyzes predatory pricing in the
presence of call externalities (i.e., taking into account the utility of receiving calls) and
termination-based price discrimination, for given termination charges. He shows that call
externalities give the incumbent an incentive to increase its o⁄-net price in order to make
a smaller rival less attractive (as it will receive fewer or shorter calls), and this incentive
is even higher when the incumbent engages in predatory pricing and seeks to reduce its
rival￿ s pro￿t. Both papers thus study how incumbents can reduce rivals￿pro￿tability in
order to limit entry, at the expense of a (possibly temporary) loss in its own pro￿t. In
contrast, we study how the incumbent can manipulate the termination charge (even when
it is reciprocal) to increase its own pro￿t at the expense of the entrant.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses
retail competition for a given, reciprocal, access charge. It ￿rst characterizes shared-
market equilibria and extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks;
it then studies under what conditions one network may corner the market. Section 4
draws the implications for the determination of the access charge and shows that, despite
Gans and King￿ s insight, an incumbent network may favour a high access charge in
order to foreclose the market. Section 5 analyses the case of no termination-based price
discrimination, while Section 6 considers a receiver pays regime. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Except for the existence of switching costs the setup is basically the same as in La⁄ont,
Rey and Tirole (1998b). There are two networks: an incumbent, I, and an entrant,
E. Both networks have the same cost structure. It costs f to connect a customer, and
each call costs c ￿ cO + cT, where cO and cT respectively denote the costs borne by
the originating and terminating networks. To terminate an o⁄-net call, the originating
5network must pay a reciprocal access charge a to the terminating network. The access
markup is thus equal to:
m ￿ a ￿ cT:
Networks o⁄er substitutable services but are di⁄erentiated ￿ la Hotelling. Consumers
are uniformly distributed on the segment [0;1], whereas the two networks are located at
the two ends of this segment. Consumers￿tastes are represented by their position on the
segment and taken into account through a "transportation" cost t > 0, which re￿ ects
their disutility from not enjoying their ideal type of service. For a given volume of calls
q, a consumer located at x and joining network i = I;E located at xi 2 f0;1g obtains a
gross utility given by:
u(q) ￿ tjx ￿ xij;
where u(q) denotes the variable gross surplus, with u0 > 0 > u00 and u0 (0) < +1. To
ensure full participation we will assume throughout the paper that the surplus derived
from being connected to either network is su¢ ciently large: u(0) ￿ t. In addition,
consumers switching to E￿ s network incur a cost s > 0.
Each network i = I;E o⁄ers a three-part tari⁄:
Ti(q; ^ q) = Fi + piq + ^ pib q;
where Fi is the ￿xed subscription fee and pi and ^ pi respectively denote the on-net and
o⁄-net usage prices:
Let ￿i denote network i￿ s market share. Assuming a balanced calling pattern,14 the
net surplus o⁄ered by network i is (for i 6= j = I;E):
wi = ￿iv(pi) + ￿jv(^ pi) ￿ Fi; (1)
14This assumption implies that the proportions of calls originating on a given network and completed
on the same or the other network re￿ ect networks￿market shares.
6where
v(p) ￿ max
q u(q) ￿ pq
denotes the consumer surplus for a price p:
In a ￿rst step, we will take as given the reciprocal termination charge and study
the subsequent competition game where the networks set simultaneously their retail tar-
i⁄s (subscription fees and usage prices), and then consumers choose which network to
subscribe and how much to call. In a second step we discuss the determination of the
termination charge. Before that, we characterize the consumer response to networks￿
prices and provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium prices.
Marginal cost pricing. As usual, networks ￿nd it optimal to adopt cost-based
usage prices. Network i￿ s pro￿t is equal to:
￿i ￿ ￿i [￿i(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + ￿j(^ pi ￿ c ￿ m)q(^ pi) + Fi ￿ f] + ￿i￿jmq(^ pj): (2)
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses wI and wE and thus market shares constant,15
then leads network i to set its prices pi and ^ pi so as to maximize
￿i f￿i [(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + v(pi)] + ￿j [(^ pi ￿ c ￿ m)q(^ pi) + v(^ pi)] ￿ wi ￿ fg + ￿i￿jmq(^ pj);
which yields marginal-cost pricing:
pi = c; ^ pi = c + m:
Thus, both networks always charge usage prices that re￿ ect the perceived cost of calls:
the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the access markup m for o⁄-net calls. As
a result, while each network i must pay ￿i￿jmq(^ pi) to its rival, there is no net intercon-
nection payment; since both networks charge the same o⁄-net price (^ pi = ^ pj = c + m),
neither the incumbent nor the entrant has a net out￿ ow of calls: ￿i￿jm(q(^ pj)￿q(^ pi)) = 0,
15As already noted, on-net pricing can generate multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices.
We assume here that changing tari⁄s so as to keep net surpluses constant does not trigger consumers to
switch to alternative responses, if they exist.
7whatever the networks￿market shares.
Network Externalities and market shares. Since the o⁄-net price increases
with the access markup, departing from cost-based termination charges generates tari⁄-
mediated network externalities. For example, if the access markup is positive, prices are
higher for o⁄-net calls and the subscribers of a given network are thus better o⁄, the more
customers join that network. As a result, there may exist multiple consumer responses
to the same set of prices.
We now determine the consumer responses to given subscription fees FI and FE,
together with cost-based usage prices. If consumers anticipate market shares ￿I and
￿E = 1 ￿ ￿I, then they expect a net surplus
wi = ￿iv(c) + ￿jv(c + m) ￿ Fi: (3)
from subscribing to network i, for i 6= j = I;E. A consumer located at a distance
x 2 [0;1] from network I is therefore willing to stay with that network when wI ￿ tx ￿
wE￿t(1￿x)￿s and prefers to switch otherwise. In a shared-market outcome, the actual














(v(c) ￿ v(c + m));
where ￿I ￿ 1; ￿E ￿ ￿1, and ￿ ￿ 1=2t measures the substitutability between the two
networks.
Any ￿xed point ￿i = ^ ￿i(￿i) that lies in (0;1) constitutes a consumer response where
the networks share the market; combining (3) and (4) then yields network i￿ s market
share, as a function of both subscription fees:








￿(m) ￿ t ￿ (v(c) ￿ v(c + m)):
Similarly, there exists a continuation equilibrium where network i corners the market
if ^ ￿i(1) ￿ 1, and a continuation equilibrium where network j corners the market if
^ ￿i(0) ￿ 0.




v(c) ￿ v(c + m)
t
:
It follows that when
￿ (m) > 0 (6)
the slope d^ ￿i=d￿i is always lower than 1 (and is even negative for m < 0), which in
turn implies that there exists a unique consumer response (see Figure 1, which plots the
"reaction to anticipations" maxf0;minf1; ^ ￿(:)gg).
i a ˆ
i a i a
i a
    A. 1 0 < < i a       B. 1 = i a             C. 0 = i a
i a ˆ i a ˆ
Figure 1: Unique and stable consumer response: v(c) ￿ v(c + m) < t:
Condition (6) depends only on the termination markup and on the transportation
parameter, and not on the ￿xed fees FI and FE or the market shares; it is moreover
strictly satis￿ed for any m ￿ 0. Therefore, when m ￿ 0 or m > 0 but not too large, for
any given ￿xed fees FI and FE, there exists a unique consumer response, which can be
characterized as follows. When the expression in (5) lies in (0;1), the two networks share
9the market and network i￿ s market share, ￿i (FI;FE), is precisely given by (5) (see Figure
1.A). When instead this expression exceeds 1, network i corners the market (Figure 1.B);
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Figure 2: Cornered-market stable consumer responses: v(c) ￿ v(c + m) > t.
Condition (6) may not hold, however, when m is positive and large. There may then
exist multiple consumer responses, as illustrated in Figure 2.A, where three possible con-
sumer responses exist: two cornered-market outcomes and one shared-market outcome.
The shared-market outcome is however unstable: a small increase in the market share of
any network triggers a cumulative process in favour of that network, and this process con-
verges towards that network cornering the market. In contrast, the two cornered-market
outcomes are stable. In particular, starting from a situation where all consumers are with
the incumbent, a few customers making a "mistake" and switching to the entrant would
not trigger any snowballing in favour of the entrant; the customers would thus regret
their mistake and wish to have stayed with the incumbent. Since customer inertia may
favour the incumbent, in the case of multiple consumer responses it may be reasonable to
assume that the stable outcome where consumers stick to the incumbent network is the
most plausible outcome. Yet, throughout the paper, we will also take into consideration
the possibility of alternative consumer responses and study under what conditions the
incumbent can make sure to keep the rival out of the market.
103 Price competition
We now characterize the equilibrium ￿xed fees, given the consumer response determined
in the previous section.
Shared-market equilibria
In the light of the above analysis, a price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market
outcome can exist only when (6) holds, in which case the consumer response is moreover
always unique. We denote by ￿i (FI;FE) the corresponding market share of network
i = I;E. Since usage prices re￿ ect costs, network i￿ s pro￿t can be written as (for
i 6= j = I;E):
￿i = ￿i (FI;FE)[Fi ￿ f + ￿j (FI;FE)mq(c + m)]: (7)
Best responses. Given the rival￿ s fee Fj, we can use the market share de￿nition (5)
to express Fi and ￿i as a function of ￿i:
Fi = Fj + ￿ (m) + ￿is ￿ 2￿ (m)￿i;
￿i(￿i) = ￿i [Fj + ￿(m) + ￿is ￿ f + mq(c + m) ￿ 2’(m)￿i]; (8)
where




and ￿I = ￿￿E = 1. The ￿rst-order derivative is
d￿i
d￿i
= Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f ￿ 4’(m)￿i; (9)
while the second-order derivative is negative if and only if:
’(m) > 0: (10)
When this second-order condition holds, we have:
11￿ if Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f ￿ 0, network i￿ s best response is to leave the
market to its rival (i.e., ￿i = 0), and any F r
i ￿ Fj+￿is+￿(m) is thus a best-response
to Fj (see the dashed areas in Figure 3);
￿ if Fj +￿(m)+mq(c+m)+￿is￿f ￿ 4’(m), network i￿ s best response is to corner
the market (￿i = 1), and thus F r
i (Fj) = Fj + ￿is ￿ ￿(m) (45￿ lines in Figure 3),
￿ if 4’(m) > Fj +￿(m)+mq(c+m)+￿is￿f > 0, network i￿ s best response entails
a shared-market outcome, ￿i 2 (0;1):
￿i =
Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f
4’(m)
; (11)




(￿(m) + mq(c + m))(Fj + ￿is) + ￿(m)(f + ￿(m))
2’(m)
:
where the denominator is positive as long as the second-order condition holds.
Equilibrium. Solving for the ￿rst-order conditions yields:
Fi = f + ￿(m) +




  (m) ￿ ￿ (m) +
2
3
mq (c + m):
Substituting (12) into (5), equilibrium market shares are given by









It is easy to check that   (m) > 0 in any candidate shared-market equilibrium,16 which
implies that the market share ￿I exceeds 1=2 and increases with s. Therefore, it cor-
16When subscription fees are (weak) strategic complements (@Fi=@Fj ￿ 0, or ￿(m)+mq(c+m) ￿ 0),
(6) implies   (m) > 0, since 3 (m) = 2(￿(m) + mq(c + m)) + ￿(m) > 0; when subscription fees are
instead strategic substitutes (@Fi=@Fj < 0, or ￿ (m) + mq (m) < 0), the candidate equilibrium is stable
(i.e., @Fi=@Fj > ￿1) if and only if  (m) > 0.
12responds indeed to a shared-market equilibrium (i.e., ￿i < 1) when and only when s is
small enough, namely, when




















































Figure 3: Shared-market equilibria. aI = f ￿ mq(c + m), bI = f + 2￿(m) + mq(c + m),
aE = f + s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c + m), bE = f + s + 3￿(m) + mq(c + m).
When m ￿ 0, (6) implies (10) and 0 < @Fi=@Fj < 1. When instead m < 0, (6) is
always satis￿ed and subscription fees remain strategic complements (i.e., @Fi=@Fj > 0) as
long as ￿(m)+mq(c+m) > 0, in which case (10) also holds and @Fi=@Fj < 1. Therefore,
in those two situations, whenever the shared-market condition (14) holds there exists a
unique price equilibrium, as illustrated by Figure 3.A; this equilibrium involves a shared
market characterized by (12), strategic complementarity and stability. If instead m < 0
and ￿(m) + mq(c + m) < 0, subscription fees are strategic substitutes. However, the
shared-market condition (14) then implies (10) and @Fi=@Fj > ￿1; therefore, the price
equilibrium is again unique and stable, as illustrated by Figure 3.B, and involves again
a shared market characterized by (12). In all cases, (6) moreover implies that consumer
responses to prices yield a stable market outcome. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 A stable price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market outcome exists,
in which case it is the unique price equilibrium, if and only if (6) and (14) hold.
13Proposition 1 shows that a stable shared-market equilibrium exists when the termi-
nation charge is not too high (condition (6)) and switching costs are moreover moderate
(condition (14)). For example, for cost-based access charges (m = 0), such an equilibrium
exists when s < 3t.17 When this condition is satis￿ed, a shared-market equilibrium also
exists (and is then the unique equilibrium) when the termination markup is positive, as
long as (6) and (14) remain satis￿ed.
Comparative statics. We now study the impact of the access charge on shared-
market equilibrium pro￿ts. Gans and King (2001) show that symmetric networks prefer
access charges below marginal costs. Intuitively, when m is negative, o⁄-net calls are
priced below on-net calls, so consumers prefer to join smaller networks, all else being
equal. Consequently, networks bid less aggressively for marginal customers. The next
proposition con￿rms that, as long as the two networks share the market, price competition
is softened when m decreases below zero, independently of networks￿sizes.
Proposition 2 In the range of termination charges yielding a shared-market equilibrium,
there exists a termination subsidy (m < 0) that gives both networks greater pro￿ts than
any non-negative termination markup.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks. It how-
ever only applies to termination markups that are small enough to yield a shared-market
equilibrium. As we will see, networks may actually favour more extreme termination
markups that allow them to corner the market and charge high prices.18
17As mentioned earlier, to ensure full participation we assume throughout the analysis that t is small
enough, compared with the utility derived from being connected to either network. Under cost-based
access charges, the marginal consumer￿net utility is equal to:




Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for full participation is v (c)￿f > 3t, since then the marginal consumer
obtains a positive net utility whenever a shared-market equilibrium exists, i.e., whenever s < 3t.
18The same comment applies to the case of symmetric operators considered by Gans and King (which
corresponds here to s = 0). While they show that networks￿symmetric shared-market equilibrium
pro￿ts are maximal for a negative mark-up, more extreme mark-ups (including positive ones) may induce
cornered-market equilibria that generate greater industry pro￿ts.
14Cornered-market equilibria
We now study under what conditions a network operator can corner the market.
Suppose ￿rst that (6) still holds, ensuring that there is a unique consumer response
to subscription fees. From the above analysis, a cornered-market equilibrium can then
exist only when condition (14) fails to hold.
In a candidate equilibrium where network i corners the market, the consumers located
at the other end of the segment must prefer to stick to i￿ s network; that is, for i 6= j = I;E:
v (c) ￿ t ￿ Fi ￿ v (c + m) ￿ ￿is ￿ Fj;
or:
Fi ￿ Fj ￿ ￿ (m) + ￿is: (15)
Furthermore, if this inequality holds strictly then i can increase its subscription fee and
still corner the market. Therefore, a necessary equilibrium condition is:
Fi = Fj ￿ ￿ (m) + ￿is: (16)
In addition: (i) network i should not prefer to charge a higher fee and increase its margin
at the expense of its market share; and (ii) its rival should not be able to attract consumers
and make positive pro￿ts. The precise interpretation of these two conditions depends on
the concavity of the pro￿t functions.
Concave pro￿ts. When (10) also holds, each operator￿ s pro￿t is globally concave
with respect to its own price; the relevant deviations thus involve marginal price changes
leading to a shared-market outcome. A candidate equilibrium satisfying (16) is therefore
indeed an equilibrium if and only if:
￿ Network i does not gain from a marginal increase in its fee;19 given the previous
analysis of best responses, this amounts to Fj + ￿(m) + ￿is ￿ f + mq(c + m) ￿
19Note that this condition ensures that i obtains a non-negative pro￿t ￿otherwise, a small increase
in Fi would reduce its loss. Indeed, (16) and (17) imply Fi > f when the second-order condition (10)
holds.
154(￿(m) + mq(c + m)=2), or:
Fj ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ ￿is; (17)
￿ The rival network j does not gain from a marginal reduction in its fee or, equiv-
alently, cannot make a positive pro￿t by attracting its closest consumers; this
amounts to:
Fj ￿ f ￿ mq (c + m): (18)
Network j￿ s fee must therefore lie in the range
f ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ Fj ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ ￿is; (19)
which is feasible only when




For the incumbent (i = I, for which ￿I = 1), this condition is satis￿ed whenever (14)
fails to hold. Any pair of subscription fees (FI;FE) satisfying
FI = FE ￿ ￿ (m) + s (21)
and
f ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ FE ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ s (22)
then constitutes a price equilibrium where I corners the market. Among those equilibria,
only one does not rely on weakly dominated strategies for E, and is therefore trembling-
hand perfect: this is the one where
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Figure 4: Cornered-market equilibria. aI = f ￿mq(c+m), bI = f +2￿(m)+mq(c+m),
aE = f+s￿￿(m)￿mq(c+m), bE = f+s+3￿(m)+mq(c+m); cI = f￿s￿￿(m)￿mq(c+m),
dI = f ￿ s + 3￿(m) + mq(c + m), cE = f ￿ mq(c + m), dE = f + 2￿(m) + mq(c + m).
By contrast, E can corner the market only if




It follows that E cannot corner the market if m ￿ 0 (since the left-hand side is then
positive under (6)); however, the left-hand side may become negative and possibly lower
than ￿s=3 when m is largely negative, in which case there can be a continuum of equilibria
in which E corners the market by charging
FE = FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s; (24)
including a unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium where I sets FI = f ￿mq (c + m)
and E thus charges FE = f ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ s(> f).
Note ￿nally that, since (20) is more demanding for E than for I, I can corner the
market whenever E can do so (that is, both cornered market equilibria exist whenever E
17can corner the market). Figure 4 illustrates this case.
Convex pro￿ts. When (10) fails to hold, each operator￿ s pro￿t is convex with respect
to its own subscription fee. The relevant strategies then consist in either cornering the
market or leaving it to the rival. Thus, in a candidate equilibrium where I corners the
market, it must be the case that:
￿ I does not gain from "opting out", i.e., it should obtain a non-negative pro￿t:
FI ￿ f:
￿ E does not gain from lowering its subscription fee so as to corner the market, i.e.,
from charging FE satisfying (24):
FE = FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s ￿ f:
It follows that I￿ s equilibrium price must satisfy:
f + ￿ (m) + s ￿ FI ￿ f; (25)
where the left-hand side is indeed always higher than the right-hand side under (6).
Conversely, any set of prices satisfying (21) and (25) constitutes an equilibrium in which
I corners the market.
We can similarly study under what conditions E can corner the market: condition
(24) must hold, E must obtain a non-negative pro￿t (i.e., FE ￿ f) and I should not be
able to make a pro￿t by cornering the market, i.e.:
FI = FE ￿ ￿ (m) + s ￿ f:
Thus, in this equilibrium E￿ s equilibrium fee satis￿es:
f + ￿(m) ￿ s ￿ FE ￿ f;
18and such an equilibrium thus exists if and only if
s ￿ ￿ (m):
It follows that when E corners the market, I￿ s equilibrium price lies in the range [f +

























































Figure 5: A) Only the incumbent corners the market: s > ￿(m): B) The incumbent or
the entrant corners the market: s < ￿(m).
Figure 5 summarizes this analysis. When s > ￿ (m), only I can corner the market
and it can achieve that while charging any price between f and f + ￿ (m) + s. When
instead s ￿ ￿ (m), however, E may also corner the market.
Multiple consumer responses. Last, we turn to the case where (6) does not hold
(i.e. ￿ (m) ￿ 0), in which case there is never a stable shared-market consumer allocation,
and there may be multiple cornered-market equilibria:
￿ when
FE > FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s; (26)
there is a unique consumer response, in which I corners the market (b ￿i(0) > 0,
Figure 2.B);
19￿ when instead
FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s ￿ FE ￿ FI + ￿ (m) ￿ s; (27)
there are two stable consumer responses, in which either I or E corners the market
(b ￿i(0) < 0 and b ￿i(1) > 1, Figure 2.A);20
￿ ￿nally, when
FE < FI + ￿ (m) ￿ s; (28)
there is again a unique consumer response, in which E corners the market (b ￿i(1) <
1, Figure 2.C).
Obviously, a network can corner the market more easily when consumers favour that
network in case of multiple responses to prices.
Suppose ￿rst that customer inertia, say, systematically favours the incumbent in the
"middle" case corresponding to (27). Then I wins the whole market as long as FI ￿FE ￿
s￿￿ (m), otherwise E wins the market. Since s￿￿ (m) > 0, I bene￿ts from a competitive
advantage in this Bertrand competition for the market and therefore corners the market
in equilibrium. Moreover, ignoring weakly dominated strategies for E, the equilibrium
is unique and such that FE = f and FI = f + s ￿ ￿ (m), giving I a positive pro￿t,
￿I = s ￿ ￿(m), which moreover increases with m.
Suppose now that customer activism, say, is instead favourable to the entrant, i.e.,
consumers stick to E in case of multiple consumer responses. Then I wins the market
only when FI ￿ FE ￿ s + ￿ (m); therefore:
￿ When the switching cost is large enough, namely
s ￿ ￿￿(m);
20As usual with network e⁄ects, di⁄erent expectations yield multiple consumer responses, which in
turn may sustain multiple equilibria. The network e⁄ect arises here from on-net pricing rather than
traditional club e⁄ects. In a di⁄erent context, Matutes and Vives (1996) show that di⁄erent expectations
about the success of banks and coordination problems among depositors can result in multiple shared-
and cornered-market equilibria (and even in a no-banking equilibrium).
20then I still enjoys a competitive advantage and corners again the market in equilib-
rium; ignoring weakly dominated strategies, in equilibrium E sells at cost (FE = f)
and I obtains a pro￿t, ￿I = s + ￿(m)(< s), which decreases with m.
￿ When instead the switching cost is low (s < ￿￿ (m)), the tari⁄-mediated network
externalities dominate and customer activism gives a competitive advantage to E;
as a result, in all equilibria E corners the market.21
Recap. The above analysis can be summarized as follows. When m = 0, conditions
(6) and (10) hold; therefore, from the above analysis, E cannot corner the market (this
would require s < ￿3t, a contradiction), whereas I can corner the market only if the
switching cost is prohibitively high, namely:
s ￿ 3t:
When the switching cost is not that high, I may still corner the market when the ter-
mination charge departs from cost; however, E may then also corner the market. More
precisely:
Proposition 3 Cornered-market equilibria exist in the following circumstances:
￿ Unique consumer response (￿ (m) > 0):
￿Concave pro￿ts (’(m) > 0): there exists an equilibrium in which I corners the
market when   (m) ￿ s=3; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners
the market when   (m) ￿ ￿s=3.
￿Convex pro￿ts (’(m) ￿ 0): there always exists an equilibrium in which I cor-
ners the market; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners the market
when ￿ (m) ￿ s.
￿ Multiple consumer responses (￿ (m) ￿ 0):
21In the limit case where s = ￿￿ (m), both I and E can corner the market in equilibrium, but earn
zero pro￿t anyway.
21￿Customer inertia favourable to the incumbent: there exists a unique equilib-
rium, in which I corners the market and its pro￿t furthermore (weakly) in-
creases with m.
￿Customer activism favourable to the entrant: there generically exists a unique
equilibrium; in this equilibrium, I corners the market when ￿ (m) > ￿s (and
I￿ s pro￿t decreases with m), whereas E corners the market when ￿ (m) < ￿s.
Building on this proposition, we have:
￿ For positive termination markups (m > 0),   (m) > ’(m), and both ￿ (m) and
  (m) decrease with m, as long as q (c + m) > 0. Therefore, I can corner the
market when the access markup is so large that either   (m) ￿ s=3 (in which case
(14) fails), or ￿ (m) ￿ 0 (in which case (6) fails). In contrast, E cannot corner
the market when I bene￿ts from customer inertia in case of multiple consumer
responses; and even if E bene￿ts instead from customer activism, it cannot corner
the market as long as ￿ (m) > ￿s.
￿ For termination subsidies (m < 0), ’(m) >   (m) and (6) holds, implying that
there exists a unique, stable consumer response to prices. When ’(m) > 0, pro￿ts
are concave and I can again corner the market when   (m) ￿ s=3; both E and I
can corner the market, however, when   (m) ￿ ￿s=3. When instead ’(m) < 0,
pro￿ts are convex and I can always corner the market, whereas E can corner the
market, too, only when ￿ (m) ￿ s.
4 Strategic choice of the access charge
When the switching cost is very high, namely s ￿ 3t, the entrant cannot obtain any
positive market share even under a cost-based access charge (m = 0). The incumbent
does however bene￿t from an increase in the access charge, as this further weakens the
competitive pressure from its rival and generates greater pro￿ts: starting from m = 0, for
which the stability condition (6) and the second-order condition (10) hold strictly, a slight
22increase in the termination charge does not violate these conditions and still induces a
cornered-market equilibrium; in this equilibrium, I￿ s pro￿t is equal to
￿
C
I (m) ￿ s ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ mq (c + m);





0 (c + m) > 0:
When instead s < 3t, as we will assume in the rest of this section, the entrant
successfully enters the market if the access charge is close to the termination cost (m ’
0). However, departing signi￿cantly from cost-based access may allow the incumbent to
corner the market. We now study in more detail this strategic incentive to alter the access
charge in order to deter entry and increase the incumbent￿ s pro￿t.
Foreclosure through high termination charges
Our extension of Gans and King￿ s insight shows that increasing the termination charge
degrades both operators￿pro￿ts as long as the market remains shared. But further in-
creasing the termination charge keeps the entrant entirely out of the market whenever
tari⁄-mediated network externalities are su¢ ciently important, namely, whenever




Indeed, under this condition, there exists a unique ￿ m > 0 such that   (￿ m) = s=3, and
  (m) < s=3 for any m > ￿ m. As long as ￿ (m) remains positive (which may or may not be
possible, since ￿ (￿ m) can be positive or negative), increasing m above ￿ m then generates
a unique equilibrium in which I corners the market and obtains again ￿C
I (m), which
increases with m. However, if
￿ > t; (30)
23then there exists a unique ^ m > 0 such that ￿ (^ m) = 0 and ￿ (m) < 0 for any m > ^ m.
Raising m above ^ m then ensures that consumers always prefer to be all on the same
network, but the pro￿tability of this foreclosure strategy depends critically on which
network is then more likely to win the market. For the sake of exposition, we will focus
on two polar cases where, in case of multiple consumer responses, either customer inertia
systematically favours the incumbent, or customer activism systematically favours the
entrant.
Customer inertia. When I bene￿ts from customer inertia, it can keep the entrant
out and better exploit its market power by raising further the termination charge above




I (m) = f + s ￿ ￿ (m);




= q (c + m) ￿ 0:
Therefore, the incumbent has an incentive to set m as high as possible, in order to
extract consumer surplus without fearing any competitive pressure from the entrant. The
only limitations come from consumer demand:
￿ Consumers may stop calling; raising m above ￿ m, de￿ned as the lowest value for
which q (c + ￿ m) = 0, does not increase I￿ s pro￿t any further: for m > ￿ m, dF CI
I =dm =
0.
￿ Consumers may also stop participating; there is no point insisting on larger termina-
tion markups than needed to sustain the monopoly level. If for example consumers￿
surplus v (c) is su¢ ciently "large" that even a pure monopoly prefers to maintain
full participation, the optimal subscription fee extracts the full value from the far-
thest consumer
￿
F M = v (c) ￿ t
￿
; if ￿ is large enough, F M can be sustained by




= F M, that is,
24such that:










= f + s:
Customer inertia, which could be interpreted as a form of "virtual" switching costs, is
a good substitute for "real" switching costs. Indeed, in the presence of customer inertia,
the incumbent can corner the market and earn the monopoly pro￿t even in the absence
of any real switching costs. As we will show below, however, in the presence of customer
activism real switching costs are needed and determine equilibrium pro￿ts.
Customer activism. If instead customer activism favours the entrant in case of
multiple consumer responses, then I never bene￿ts from increasing the termination charge
beyond ^ m, since the resulting pro￿t then decreases with m. Its pro￿t does increase in the
range where I corners the market while (6) still holds (that is, for ￿ m ￿ m ￿ ^ m, where
￿ m is the positive solution to   (m) = s=3), but, as noted above, it decreases in the range
in which the market is shared (that is, for 0 ￿ m < ￿ m). If ￿ is large enough (namely,
￿ > t), to determine whether foreclosing the market is pro￿table for I, one should thus
compare the pro￿ts obtained for m = ^ m, which is equal to
^ ￿I = s;
with the pro￿t that could be obtained by sharing the market. In particular, ^ ￿I = s should












The comparison su¢ ces to show that this foreclosure strategy cannot be pro￿table when
22Indeed, mM > ^ m: to ensure that even E would maintain full participation if it enjoyed a monopoly




= t ￿ v (c) + v
￿
c + mM￿
= t + f + s ￿ v (c) < 0:
25the switching cost is small, namely, when







that is, when even in the absence of any termination markup, the incumbent would keep

















Foreclosure through large termination subsidies
Alternatively, I can try to foreclose the market by adopting a large subsidy (m << 0). For
m < 0, the stability condition (6) always holds, implying that there is a unique, stable,
consumer response to prices (the issue of customer inertia or favoritism thus becomes
irrelevant). Moreover, ’(m) =   (m)￿mq (c + m)=6 ￿   (m), which implies that pro￿ts
are concave (’(m) > 0) whenever the shared market condition (  (m) > s=3) is satis￿ed.
For a su¢ ciently large subsidy, one may have   (m) ￿ s=3. However, as long as pro￿ts
remain concave, I￿ s pro￿t coincides again with ￿C
I (m) and thus decreases when the size
of the termination subsidy increases (in addition, E may as well corner the market if
  (m) ￿ ￿s=3). Yet, I may bene￿t from increasing further the size of the subsidy, so as
to make pro￿ts convex (i.e., ’(m) ￿ 0); there is an equilibrium in which I corners the
market and can charge up to F Conv





= ￿q (c + m) < 0:
Foreclosing the market therefore requires subsidies that are large enough to make
pro￿ts convex (i.e., to ensure ’(m) ￿ 0), which may be di¢ cult to achieve:
￿ First, ’ may remain positive: starting from m = 0, introducing a small subsidy in-
creases ’, since ’0 (0) = ￿q (c)=2 < 0; while ’0 (m) = (mq0 (c + m) ￿ q (c + m))=2
may become positive for larger subsidies, there is no guarantee that this happens,
and even in that case, there is no guarantee that ’ may become negative for large
26enough subsidies.
￿ Second, the size of subsidies may be limited by feasibility considerations; even "bill
and keep" ￿i.e., m = ￿cT ￿may not su¢ ce to generate a large enough subsidy.
￿ Third, very large subsidies and convex pro￿ts may allow the entrant, too, to corner
the market; to avoid this, the incumbent should choose a termination charge satisfy-
ing ￿ (m) < s, which, since ￿0 (m) < 0 for m < 0, imposes an additional restriction
on the size of the subsidy (in particular, this restriction may be incompatible with
’(m) ￿ 0).
￿ Finally, subsidizing termination may generate abuses and, moreover, o⁄ering lower
prices for o⁄-net calls may not ￿t well with marketing strategies.
Despite these di¢ culties, large subsidies may in some cases allow the incumbent to
corner the market and increase its pro￿t. For example, if ’(m) < 0 for the termination
subsidy such that ￿ (m) = s, then adopting this subsidy (or a slightly lower one) ensures
that I corners the market and obtains a pro￿t equal to s+￿ (m) = 2s, which is twice the
maximal pro￿t that I can obtain by foreclosing the market through a positive termination
markup when customer activism bene￿ts the entrant.
Recap
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 4 Suppose that s < 3t, so that cost-oriented access pricing would allow the
entrant to share the market. While both networks would favour a small reduction in the
access charge over a small increase in the access charge, the incumbent might increase
its pro￿t by departing further away from cost-based access pricing in order to corner the
market; assuming that network externalities are large enough:
￿ If the incumbent bene￿ts from customer inertia in case of multiple consumer re-
sponses, then it would have an incentive to increase the access charge as much as
possible and could earn in this way up to the monopoly pro￿t.
27￿ If instead the entrant bene￿ts from customer activism, then by foreclosing the mar-
ket through a positive termination markup, the incumbent can earn a pro￿t at most
equal to s, which it can achieve by adopting m = ^ m, such that ￿(m) = 0; the incum-
bent may also bene￿t from foreclosing the market through a large enough termina-
tion subsidy, although feasibility, strategic (equilibrium multiplicity) and marketing
considerations tend to limit this possibility.
Illustration: linear demand function. Suppose that the utility function takes the
form





with a;b > 0. The demand function is then linear, q(p) = (a ￿ p)=b, while consumer￿ s
surplus is v(p) = (a￿p)2=2b. We adopt the parameter values of De Bijl and Peitz (2002,
2004): a = 20 euro-cents, b = 0:015 euro-cent, cT = 0:5 euro-cent, c = cO + cT = 2
euro-cents, and t = 35 euros.23 The feasible range for the termination markup is thus
m ￿ ￿cT = ￿0:5 euro-cent and, in this range, it can be checked that ’ and  , as well as ￿,
are all decreasing in m. In particular, condition (6) is satis￿ed for m < ^ m = 3:2014 euro-
cent, in which case the second-order condition ’(m) > 0 is also satis￿ed. In addition, the
shared-market condition (14),   (m) > s=3, amounts to m < ￿ m(s), where ￿ m(s) decreases
with s. Therefore, for any s < 3t (so as to ensure that the market would be shared for m =
0, that is, ￿ m(s) > 0), the market is always shared whenever access is subsidized (m < 0)
or moderately priced (that is, m < minf^ m; ￿ m(s)g); the incumbent can however corner
the market by insisting on a large enough access markup (m > minf^ m; ￿ m(s)g).24 It can
moreover be checked that, in the limited admissible range of negative values for m, the
incumbent￿ s (shared-market) equilibrium pro￿t decreases with m; "bill and keep￿(that
is, m = ￿cT = ￿0:5 euro-cent) thus constitutes the most pro￿table access agreement in
this range. Below we compare this pro￿t with the pro￿t that the incumbent can achieve
by cornering the market through large access markups. To complete the welfare analysis
23In De Bijl and Peitz (2002), t = 60 euros, whereas in De Bijl and Peitz (2004), t = 20 euros. Since
this parameter is di¢ cult to measure, its value is based on experience obtained in the test runs of their
model. Adopting t = 35 euros ensures that v(c) > 3t.
24By contrast, E cannot corner the market in the absence of customer activism, since (6) here implies
(14).


































Figure 6: Incumbent￿ s equilibrium pro￿t for small switching costs: s = 5 euros.
we also study the impact of the access charge on consumer surplus (CS), net of ￿xed fees
and switching and transport costs:







t(1 ￿ x)dx ￿ s￿E:
For illustrative purposes, we consider two polar cases: i) small switching costs: s = 5
euros; ii) large switching costs: s = 70 euros.
￿ Small switching costs: We have ￿ m(s) = 6:98 > ^ m = 3:2. Therefore, for m < ^ m the
market is shared between the two networks whereas for m ￿ ^ m, there are multiple
consumer responses. In that latter range, I corners the market; if it moreover
bene￿ts from customer inertia, its pro￿t increases with m and, for m large enough,
exceeds the pro￿t achieved when sharing the market under lower access charges.
In case of customer activism, however, I￿ s pro￿t decreases with m, as illustrated
in Figure 6 ￿and E moreover corners the market when m becomes large enough
(namely, when m ￿ 3:72, where ￿ (m) ￿ ￿s). In addition, I￿ s pro￿t from cornering
the market through ^ m, ￿I = s, is lower than in any shared-market equilibrium.
Thus, I would here choose to foreclose the market through large access markups
only when it bene￿ts from customer inertia.
￿ Large switching costs: We now have ￿ m(s) = 2:71 < ^ m = 3:2. Therefore, for m < ￿ m
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Figure 7: Incumbent￿ s equilibrium pro￿t for large switching costs: s = 70 euros.
the two networks share the market, whereas for m between ￿ m and ^ m I corners
the market (even though there is a unique consumer response and pro￿t functions
are concave) by charging FI = f + s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c + m). In this equilibrium, I￿ s
pro￿t increases with m. For m > ^ m, there are multiple consumer responses and I
still corners the market, although its pro￿t increases with m only if it bene￿ts from
customer inertia, as illustrated by Figure 7. I￿ s pro￿t from cornering the market
with m = ^ m is now higher than in any shared-market equilibrium (even with "bill
and keep"), however. Therefore, even in case of customer activism, I will here prefer
to corner the market with a large enough access markup (namely, ^ m) rather than
sharing the market with lower or below-cost access charges.
Consumer surplus. In both cases (for small and large switching costs), consumer
surplus increases with m as long as the networks share the market. The reason is that
competition is more aggressive for higher access charges. Also, in both cases, the incum-
bent corners the market when m ￿ ^ m and consumer surplus then decreases (increases)
with m in the presence of customer inertia (activism), since a higher m, reduces (in-
creases) the competitive pressure of the entrant. Finally, in the case of large switching
costs, the incumbent also corners the market when m lies between ￿ m and ^ m, and in this
range increasing the access charge reduces the competitive pressure, allows the incumbent
to charge a higher ￿xed fee and thus results in lower consumer surplus.
305 No termination-based price discrimination
In this section we examine whether the incumbent can foreclose competition through
access charges when there is no termination-based price discrimination. Network i￿ s
pro￿t is then (for i 6= j = I;E):
￿i = ￿i[(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + Fi ￿ f + ￿jm(q(pj) ￿ q(pi))]:
A detailed analysis of shared-market equilibria can be found in Carter and Wright (2003)
and L￿pez (2007). Market shares are given by:
￿I (wI;wE) = 1 ￿ ￿E (wI;wE) =
1
2
+ ￿ (wI ￿ wE ￿ s);
where wi = v (pi) ￿ Fi denotes the net surplus that operator i o⁄ers its customers. We
can interpret network i￿ s strategy as o⁄ering a price pi and a net surplus wi and, given
network j￿ s strategy, network i￿ s best response moreover entails
pi = e pi (wi) = c + e ￿j (wi)m: (32)
Therefore, given network j￿ s strategy, we can write network i￿ s pro￿t as




i (wi) = ￿ [v (e pi) ￿ wi ￿ f + (e ￿j ￿ e ￿i)mq (pj) + e ￿imq (e pi)] ￿ e ￿i;
e ￿
00
i (wi) = ￿￿
￿





For m = 0, e ￿
00
i (wi) = ￿2￿ < 0 and second-order conditions therefore hold. First-order












31so a shared-market equilibrium exists provided that s < 3t, in which case the incumbent￿ s















We also know from the previous papers that any small departure from m = 0 lowers the
incumbent￿ s pro￿t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which I corners the market. In the light of
the above analysis, it follows that pI = c and pE = c + m. For this to be an equilibrium,
even the consumers closest to E must prefer to stay with I, that is, v(c) ￿ t ￿ FI ￿
v(c + m) ￿ s ￿ FE; and since I maximizes its pro￿t, this inequality cannot be strict,
therefore:
FI = FE ￿ ￿(m) + s: (33)
Moreover, I should not gain from a marginal increase in its fee:




￿I=1 = ￿ [FI ￿ f + m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m))] ￿ 1;
that is:
FI ￿ f + 2t ￿ m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m)): (34)
In addition, E should not make any pro￿t by stealing a few consumers, that is:
FE ￿ f + mq(c) ￿ 0: (35)
Using (33), we can rewrite conditions (34) and (35) as:
f ￿ mq(c) ￿ FE ￿ f + 2t + ￿(m) ￿ s ￿ m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m)): (36)
Conversely, any FE in the above range can support a cornered-market equilibrium if
second-order conditions are moreover satis￿ed; eliminating weakly dominated strategies
singles out the equilibrium in which FE = f ￿ mq(c), FI = f ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c) + s and
32network I￿ s pro￿t is equal to:
￿
c
I(m) = s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c):
This expression is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to ￿c
I(0) = s ￿ t. Therefore,
when s > 3t, in which case there is no shared-market equilibria and thus I always corners
the market, I￿ s pro￿t is maximal for m = 0 (and the above-described cornered-market
equilibrium indeed exists, since second-order conditions are always satis￿ed for m = 0).
We now show that, when s < 3t, I cannot gain from departing from m = 0 in order to
corner the market. It su¢ ces to show
￿
c



























Since ￿(3t) = 0 and ￿
0(s) > 0 (since s < 3t), it follows that ￿(s) < 0 for s < 3t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which E corners the market, then pI = c+m
and pE = c: Moreover, the pair of prices (FI;FE) must satisfy
v(c + m) ￿ FI ￿ v(c) ￿ FE ￿ s ￿ t:
In addition, I should not make any pro￿t by attracting a few customers, i.e.,
FI ￿ f ￿ mq(c):
But combining those two conditions yields
￿E = FE ￿ f ￿ v(c) ￿ v(c + m) ￿ mq(c) ￿ s ￿ t;
where the right-hand side is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to ￿s￿t < 0. Therefore,
33in the absence of termination-based price discrimination the entrant cannot corner the
market.
6 Competition under the Receiver Pays regime and
no termination-based price discrimination
In many European countries networks do not charge for receiving calls even when it is
not explicitly forbidden by NRAs. In contrast, in the United States mobile network
operators usually charge their subscribers for the calls they receive. The reason may be
an endogenous price response to the level of the termination charge, i.e., low termination
charges in the U.S. may induce networks to charge their customers for receiving calls
so as to recover their cost. Cambini and Valletti (2007) show for example that when
there exist interdependencies between incoming and outgoing calls, operators charge for
reception only when termination charges are low enough.
This section builds on Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004) and L￿pez (2008), where sub-
scribers derive a surplus from making and receiving calls, and networks o⁄er a three-part
tari⁄: fFi;pi;rig, where ri denotes the per-unit reception charge. Thus, termination-
based price discrimination is not allowed.25 Let ￿(q) denote the utility from making q
calls, and e ￿(e q) denote the utility from receiving e q calls. For a given pi the caller￿ s demand
is given by ￿0(q) = p, whereas for a given r the receiver￿ s demand is given by e ￿
0(e q) = r;26
assuming that receivers are allowed to hang up, the volume of calls from network i to
network j is then Q(pi;rj) = minfq(pi); e q(rj)g. In order to make the analysis tractable,
those papers assume that i) the caller￿ s and receiver￿ s utilities are subject to a random
noise, which smoothes the demand,27 and ii) the caller￿ s and receiver￿ s utilities are addi-
tively separable with respect to the random noise: u = ￿(q)+"q and e u = e ￿(e q)+e "e q, where
25Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004) show that allowing networks to charge di⁄erent calling and reception
charges according to whether the call is on- or o⁄-net, creates strong incentives for connectivity breakdown
through in￿nite calling or reception charges (even among equal networks).




27More speci￿cally, in Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004) only the receiver￿ s utility is subject to a random
noise, which is enough to smooth the demand. L￿pez (2008) generalizes their setup by allowing a random
noise in both the callers￿and receivers￿utilities. We are considering this more general setup.
34" and e " denote, respectively, the random shocks on the caller￿ s and receiver￿ s utilities.
Consumers learn the realization of " and e " only after their subscription decisions,
which they thus base on expected volumes. Both papers show that charging calls and
receptions at the o⁄-net cost is a candidate equilibrium:
pi = c + m; ri = ￿m:
L￿pez (2008) extends the analysis to asymmetric installed bases and positive switching
costs, and moreover shows that this o⁄-net-cost pricing equilibrium exists and is the
unique possible equilibrium when networks are relatively poor substitutes and the random
noise has a wide enough support. In addition, when setting usage prices at the o⁄-net
cost, network i￿ s pro￿t writes as:
b ￿i = ￿i(Fi;Fj)[Fi ￿ f];
where ￿i(Fi;Fj) = 1=2 + (2￿0
i ￿ 1)￿s ￿ ￿(Fi ￿ Fj): Since b ￿i does not depend on m; it
follows that the access markup has no impact on networks￿equilibrium ￿xed fees, and
thus on networks￿pro￿ts. This pro￿t-neutrality result implies that, in the absence of
termination-based price discrimination, networks cannot use access charges to soften or
foreclose competition when they compete in three-part tari⁄s. The reason is that for
any given access markup and installed bases of customers, the operators always ￿nd it
optimal to set usage prices at the o⁄-net cost, which in turn neutralizes the impact of
the access charge on pro￿t.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the impact of reciprocal access charges on entry when consumers face
switching costs, and networks compete in three-part tari⁄s, charging possibly di⁄erent
prices for o⁄-net calls. The analysis supports the conventional wisdom that established
networks prefer high access charges. In particular, when the incumbent bene￿ts from
35customer inertia, it has an incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access
markup, so as to foreclose the market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power; a
large termination subsidy could also achieve the same outcome, although subsidies may
in practice be limited by feasibility constraints and moreover trigger various types of ar-
bitrage. This possibility of successful foreclosure supports a call for regulatory authorities
to set bounds on access markups (and subsidies).
The scope for foreclosure is more limited if the entrant bene￿ts instead from customer
activism; while the incumbent can still wish to manipulate the termination charge in
order to prevent entry, too high access charges might then allow the entrant to overtake
the incumbent. As a result, optimal foreclosure strategies rely either on limited access
markups or on access subsidies, and are pro￿table only when consumers￿switching costs
are large enough.
Irrespective of whether customers tend to favour the incumbent or the entrant in case
of multiple potential responses to networks￿prices, foreclosure strategies are pro￿table
here only when they result in complete entry deterrence: while the incumbent can increase
its market share by insisting on above-cost reciprocal charges, this also results in more
intense price competition and, as a result, both operators￿equilibrium pro￿ts are lower
than when the reciprocal access charges are at or below cost. In other words, limiting
entry without deterring it entirely is never pro￿table.
Finally, the network e⁄ects created by termination-based price discrimination appear
to be a key ingredient for pro￿table foreclosure strategies. Indeed, in the absence of
on-net pricing, neither the incumbent nor the entrant ￿nd it pro￿table to manipulate
the access charge so as to foreclose competition. In addition, in a receiver pays regime,
neither operator can use the access charge to foreclose competition.
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For the sake of exposition, we will assume that q (c + m) remains positive; it is easy to
extend to the case q (c + m) ￿ 0.28
It is straightforward to check that, for m > 0, both ’ and   decrease with m. It follows
that E￿ s pro￿t decreases with m when m > 0 (since both ’ and 2￿E = 1 ￿ s=3  (m)
decrease with m).
We now show that I￿ s pro￿t satis￿es ￿I (m) < ￿I (0) for any m > 0. Since ￿I = 1 and













































0 = 2￿I (1 ￿ ￿I) 
0 < 0;
since ￿I 2 (0;1) and  
0 (m) = ￿[q (c + m) ￿ 2mq0 (c + m)]=3 < 0. Therefore,
￿(m) < ￿(0) = ￿I (0):
28For m large enough, q (c + m) may become zero; ￿,  , ’, ￿i and ￿i then remain constant as m
further increases and the analysis below still applies to the range of m over which q (c + m) > 0.
37Similarly, for m < 0 we have   (m) < ’(m) and thus:
￿I(m) > ￿(m):
Since ￿(0) = ￿I (0) and ￿0 (0) = ￿2￿I (0)(1 ￿ ￿I (0))q (c)=3 < 0, ￿I (m) > ￿I (0) for m
slightly negative.
38References
[1] ARMSTRONG, M. ￿Network Interconnection in Telecommunications￿ , Economic
Journal, Vol. 108 (1998), pp. 545-564.
[2] ARMSTRONG, M. "The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection", in M.E.
Cave, S.K. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang, eds., Handbook of Telecommunications Eco-
nomics. Amsterdam:North-Holland, 2002.
[3] ARMSTRONG, M. AND WRIGHT, J. "Mobile Call Termination", forthcoming in
Economic Journal, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014322.
[4] CAMBINI, C. AND VALLETTI, T. "Information Exchange and Competition in
Communications Networks", forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics.
[5] CALZADA, J. AND VALLETTI, T. "Network Competition and Entry Deterrence",
Economic Journal, Vol. 118 (2008), pp. 1223-1244.
[6] CARTER, M. AND WRIGHT, J. ￿Asymmetric Network Interconnection￿ , Review
of Industrial Organization, Vol. 22 (2003), pp. 27￿ 46.
[7] DE BIJL, P.W.J., PEITZ, M. Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications Mar-
kets, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[8] DE BIJL, P.W.J., PEITZ, M. "Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunica-
tions Markets: A Policy Framework", Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 16
(2004), pp. 411-437.
[9] GANS, J. AND KING, S. "Using ￿ Bill and Keep￿interconnection arrangements to
soften network competition", Economic Letters, Vol. 71 (2001), pp. 413-420.
[10] GENAKOS, C. AND VALLETTI, T. "Testing the "Waterbed" E⁄ect in Mobile
Telephony", mimeo.
[11] HOERNIG, S. "On-net and O⁄-net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications
Networks", Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 19 (2007), pp. 171-188.
39[12] JEON, D.-S., J.-J. LAFFONT and TIROLE, J. "On the Receiver Pays Principle",
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004), pp. 85-110.
[13] KLEMPERER, P. "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs", The
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 (1987), pp. 138-150.
[14] LAFFONT, J.-J., REY, P. AND TIROLE, J. "Network Competition: I. Overview
and Nondiscriminatory Pricing", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998a),
pp. 1-37.
[15] LAFFONT, J.-J., REY, P. AND TIROLE, J. "Network Competition: II. Price Dis-
crimination", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998b), pp. 38-56.
[16] LOPEZ, A.L. "Using Future Access Charges to Soften Network Competition", avail-
able at: http://www.angelluislopez.net.
[17] LOPEZ, A.L. "Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime", available at:
http://www.angelluislopez.net.
[18] MATUTES, C. AND VIVES, X. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insur-
ance", Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 5 (1996), pp. 184-216.
[19] VOGELSANG, I. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks",
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41 (2003), pp. 830-862.
40NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2009 
SD  1.2009  Michael Hoel: Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
SD  2.2009  Abay Mulatu, Reyer Gerlagh, Dan Rigby and Ada Wossink: Environmental Regulation and Industry Location
SD  3.2009  Anna Alberini, Stefania Tonin and Margherita Turvani: Rates of Time Preferences for Saving Lives in the 
Hazardous Waste Site Context 
SD  4.2009  Elena Ojea, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Maria Loureiro: Mapping of Forest Biodiversity Values: A Plural 
Perspective 
SD  5.2009  Xavier Pautrel : Macroeconomic Implications of Demography for the Environment: A Life-Cycle Perspective 
IM  6.2009  Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano and Fausto Panunzi: Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms 
IM  7.2009  Luigi Zingales: The Future of Securities Regulation 
SD  8.2009  Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Lea Nicita: How Does Climate Policy Affect Technical Change? An 
Analysis of the Direction and Pace of Technical Progress in a Climate-Economy Model 
SD  9.2009  William K. Jaeger: The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation 
SD  10.2009  Aude Pommeret and Fabien Prieur: Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Design 
SD  11.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti and Anna Montini: Regional and Sector Environmental Efficiency Empirical Evidence 
from Structural Shift-share Analysis of NAMEA data 
SD  12.2009  A. Chiabai, C. M. Travisi, H. Ding, A. Markandya and P.A.L.D Nunes: Economic Valuation of Forest 
Ecosystem Services: Methodology and Monetary Estimates 
SD  13.2009  Andrea Bigano, Mariaester Cassinelli, Fabio Sferra, Lisa Guarrera, Sohbet Karbuz, Manfred Hafner, Anil 
Markandya and Ståle Navrud: The External Cost of European Crude Oil Imports 
SD  14.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni: The Role of R&D 
and Technology Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives Using the Witch Model 
IM  15.2009  Andrea Beltratti, Marianna Caccavaio and Bernardo Bortolotti: Stock Prices in a Speculative Market: The 
Chinese Split-Share Reform 
GC  16.2009  Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: The Fragility of Social Capital  
SD  17.2009  Alexander Golub, Sabine Fuss, Jana Szolgayova and Michael Obersteiner:  Effects of Low-cost Offsets on 
Energy Investment – New Perspectives on REDD – 
SD  18.2009  Enrica De Cian: Factor-Augmenting Technical Change: An Empirical Assessment 
SD  19.2009  Irene Valsecchi: Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication 
SD  20.2009  Dimitra Vouvaki and Anastasios Xeapapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth when Factors of Production 
Generate Environmental Externalities 
SD  21.2009  Giulia Macagno, Maria Loureiro, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Richard Tol: Assessing the Impact of Biodiversity 
on Tourism Flows: A model for Tourist Behaviour and its Policy Implications 
IM  22.2009  Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson and William Miracky: Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment Patterns and Performance 
IM  23.2009  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch 
Requirements 
SD  24.2009  Andrea Bastianin: Modelling Asymmetric Dependence Using Copula Functions: An application to Value-at-
Risk in the Energy Sector 
IM  25.2009  Shai Bernstein,  Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar: The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
SD  26.2009  Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens and Alphonse Magnus: Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-
Dimensional International Environmental Model 
IM  27.2009  Frank Partnoy: Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 
SD  28.2009  Frank H. Page Jr and Myrna H. Wooders (lxxxv): Endogenous Network Dynamics 
SD  29.2009  Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijnb (lxxxv): Constrained School Choice: An 
Experimental Study 
SD  30.2009  Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch (lxxxv): Connections Among Farsighted Agents 
SD  31.2009  Antonio Nicoló and Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez (lxxxv): Feasibility Constraints and Protective Behavior in
Efficient Kidney Exchange 
SD 32.2009  Rahmi İlkiliç (lxxxv): Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms 
SD  33.2009  Luca Dall'Asta, Paolo Pin and Abolfazl Ramezanpour (lxxxv): Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game 
SD  34.2009  Edoardo Gallo (lxxxv): Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers 
SD  35.2009  Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson  (lxxxv): How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in 
Networks SD  36.2009  Markus Kinateder (lxxxv): Team Formation in a Network 
SD  37.2009  Constanza Fosco and Friederike Mengel (lxxxv): Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks 
SD  38.2009  Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann (lxxxv): Under-connected and Over-connected Networks 
SD  39.2009  Alexey Kushnir (lxxxv): Matching Markets with Signals 
SD  40.2009  Alessandro Tavoni (lxxxv): Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal 
Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games 
SD  41.2009  Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour (lxxxv): Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 
SD  42.2009  Dotan Persitz (lxxxv): Power in the Heterogeneous Connections Model: The Emergence of Core-Periphery 
Networks 
SD  43.2009  Fabio Eboli, Ramiro Parrado, Roberto Roson: Climate Change Feedback on Economic Growth: Explorations
with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Mode 
GC  44.2009  Fabio Sabatini: Does Social Capital Create Trust? Evidence from a Community of Entrepreneurs 
SD  45.2009  ZhongXiang Zhang: Is it Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s Complaints? Putting 
its Own Energy Saving into Perspective 
SD  46.2009  Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Emmanuel Petrakis: The Role of Information Provision 
as a Policy Instrument to Supplement Environmental Taxes: Empowering Consumers to Choose Optimally 
SD  47.2009  Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch: Contractually Stable Networks 
GC  48.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Susanna Mancinelli, Giovanni Ponti and Nora Piva: Education, Reputation or 
Network?  Evidence from Italy on Migrant Workers Employability 
SD  49.2009  William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas: General Pattern Formation in Recursive Dynamical Systems 
Models in Economics 
SD   50.2009  Giovanni Marin and Massimiliano Mazzanti: Emissions Trends and Labour Productivity Dynamics Sector 
Analyses of De-coupling/Recoupling on a 1990-2005 Namea 
SD  51.2009  Yoshio Kamijo and Ryo Kawasaki (lxxxv): Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing 
Market 
IM  52.2009  Laura Poddi and Sergio Vergalli: Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms? 
SD  53.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni: Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-
Growing Countries:  The Benefits of Early Action 
GC  54.2009  Alireza Naghavi and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano: Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry 
Dynamics of Offshoring 
IM  55.2009  Giacomo Calzolari and Carlo Scarpa: On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified 
Monopolist 
SD  56.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Ruben Lubowski and Alexander Golub and Anil Markandya: Linking Reduced 
Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological 
Innovation 
IM  57.2009  Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts 
SD  58.2009  Kelly C. de Bruin and Rob B. Dellink: How Harmful are Adaptation Restrictions 
SD  59.2009  Rob Dellink, Michel den Elzen, Harry Aiking, Emmy Bergsma, Frans Berkhout, Thijs Dekker, Joyeeta Gupta: 
Sharing the Burden of Adaptation Financing: An Assessment of the Contributions of Countries 
SD  60.2009  Stefania Tonin, Anna Alberini and Margherita Turvani: The Value of Reducing Cancer Risks at Contaminated 
Sites: Are More Heavily Exposed People Willing to Pay More? 
SD  61.2009  Clara Costa Duarte, Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá and Renato Rosa: The Role of Forests as Carbon Sinks: Land-Use 
and Carbon Accounting  
GC  62.2009  Carlo Altomonte and Gabor Békés: Trade Complexity and Productivity 
GC  63.2009  Elena Bellini, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Dino Pinelli and Giovanni Prarolo: Cultural Diversity and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from European Regions 
SD 64.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Romain Duval, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: 
The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic 
Analysis Using the Witch Model 
IM  65.2009  John Temple Lang: Article 82 EC – The Problems and The Solution 
SD  66.2009  P. Dumas and S. Hallegatte: Think Again: Higher Elasticity of Substitution Increases Economic Resilience 
SD  67.2009  Ruslana Rachel Palatnik and Roberto Roson: Climate Change Assessment and Agriculture in General 
Equilibrium Models: Alternative Modeling Strategies 
SD  68.2009  Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Helen Ding and Anil Markandya: The Economic Valuation of Marine Ecosystems 
IM  69.2009  Andreas Madestam: Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders 
SD  70.2009  Efthymia Kyriakopoulou and Anastasios Xepapadeas: Environmental Policy, Spatial Spillovers and the 
Emergence of Economic Agglomerations 
SD  71.2009  A. Markandya, S. Arnold, M. Cassinelli and T. Taylor: Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean: 
Legal and Economic Perspectives  
GC  72.2009  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Prarolo: Cultural Identity and Knowledge Creation in Cosmopolitan 
Cities 
SD  73.2009  Erik Ansink: Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation 
GC  74.2009  Mario A. Maggioni, Francesca Gambarotto and T. Erika Uberti: Mapping the Evolution of "Clusters": A 
Meta-analysis 
SD  75.2009  Nektarios Aslanidis: Environmental Kuznets Curves for Carbon Emissions: A Critical Survey 
SD  76.2009  Joan Canton: Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies 
SD  77.2009  Christoph M. Rheinberger: Paying for Safety: Preferences for Mortality Risk Reductions on Alpine Roads IM  78.2009  Chiara D’Alpaos, Michele Moretto, Paola Valbonesi and Sergio Vergalli: "It Is Never too late": Optimal 
Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts 
SD  79.2009  Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe: “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In Search of the Right Mix 
in the Face of Climate Change 
SD  80.2009  Giovanni Bella: A Search Model for Joint Implementation 
SD  81.2009  ZhongXiang Zhang: Multilateral Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime?: What Can Be 
Taken from the Montreal Protocol and the WTO? 
SD  82.2009  Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant, Ivan Hascic, Nick Johnstone and Yann Ménière: Invention and 
Transfer of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies on a Global Scale: A Study Drawing on Patent Data 
SD  83.2009  László Á. Kóczy: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core 
SD  84.2009  Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto: Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological Choice and the Value of 
Flexibility from Inputs Mix  
SD  85.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Enrica De Cian, Alessandra Sgobbi, and Massimo Tavoni: The 2008 WITCH Model: New 
Model Features and Baseline 
IM  86.2009  Rocco Macchiavello: Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries 
SD  87.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti and Antonio Musolesi: Carbon Kuznets Curves: Long-run Structural Dynamics and 
Policy Events 
GC  88.2009  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Christian Volpe Martincus: SMEs in Argentina: Who are the Exporters 
GC  89.2009  Gianpaolo Rossini and Cecilia Vergari: Input Production Joint Venture 
SD  90.2009  Angelo Antoci, Simone Borghesi and Marcello Galeotti: Environmental Options and Technological 
Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model 
GC  91.2009  Cristina Cattaneo: The Decision to Migrate and Social Capital: Evidence from Albania 
SD  92.2009  Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel: Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility: Specific 
Formulas and Emission Targets to Attain 460 ppm CO2 Concentrations 






















Elena Fumagalli and Laura Fumagalli: Like Oil and Water or Chocolate and Peanut Butter? Ethnic Diversity 
and Social Participation of Young People in England 
Olga Shurchkov: Gender Differences in Output Quality and Quantity under Competition and Time 
Constraints: Evidence from a Pilot Study 
Benedicte Apouey and Andrew E. Clark: Winning Big but Feeling no Better? The Effect of Lottery Prizes on 
Physical and Mental Health 
Giovanni Gallipoli and Laura Turner: Household Responses to Individual Shocks: Disability and Labor Supply
Felix Bierbrauer: On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods 









(lxxxv) This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in 
Maastricht, The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN 
group (Department of Economics, http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/12d_maa.php). 
 